SvD har en välbehövlig understreckare av Carl Johan Gardell om boken Imperial Hubris skiven av en icke namngiven CIA-analytiker. (Tack för tipset och kopian Jan-Inge!) . Den här boken är utomordentligt viktig inte minst för att den kommer innifrån CIA och därför med stor säkerhet representar synen på kriget i Afganistan och Irak av ett stort antal amerikanska underrättelseofficerare. Situationen i de båda länderna är mycket allvarlig den blir bara allvarligare dag för dag.
Jag bifogar en del av recensionen av samma bok i New York Times.
‘Imperial Hubris,” the scalding new book by a current Central Intelligence Agency officer — who was able to publish the book on the condition that his real name not be revealed — is an assessment of America’s war on terror that is bound to provoke large heapings of controversy, on both the right and the left, among hardliners on Iraq and critics of the administration alike. Readers will doubtless contest some or many of the things Anonymous has to say, but he pulls few punches in this book and gives us a fascinating window on America’s war with Al Qaeda — at least as framed by one senior analyst, who seems to have put all bureaucratic niceties aside.
It is a book that not only slings all manner of arrows at America’s political, military and intelligence establishment (going back to the mid-70’s, with the qualified exception of President Ronald Reagan and his C.I.A. director, William J. Casey), but a book that also calls for a complete re-evaluation of the nation’s foreign policy toward Muslims and the Middle East.
In its pages, prescient analyses of recent developments in the Persian Gulf and Middle East (informed by the author’s experience in the mid-1990’s as head of a C.I.A. unit assigned to tracking Osama bin Laden) jostle for space with incendiary calls for a Shermanesque exercise of American military power in a potential war with the Muslim world; maverick assessments of Islamic attitudes toward the United States, with shrill exhortations for America to adopt a neo-isolationist stance based on narrowly defined self-interest.
If the country’s foreign policy remains status quo, Anonymous warns, ”America’s military confrontation with Islam” will broaden ”with escalating human and economic expense.” He predicts that Al Qaeda ”will attack the continental United States again, that its next strike will be more damaging than that of 11 September 2001, and could include use of weapons of mass destruction.”
In addition, Anonymous accuses United States leaders, elites and media of being in denial about the nature of the Qaeda threat and the balance sheet on the war on terror: he argues that America must stop using the terrorist paradigm for Al Qaeda and accept ”the fact” that the group is ”leading a popular, worldwide, and increasingly powerful Islamic insurgency,” and he asserts that United States victories against Al Qaeda have thus far been tactical ones that have failed to slow ”the shift in strategic advantage toward al Qaeda.”
In the course of this book, Anonymous excoriates American leaders for not having had an immediate military response planned for an event like 9/11: ”None had been planned in the eleven months since the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, or in the five-plus years since bin Laden declared war” on the United States.
And he assails American generals for passively accepting their civilian leaders’ directives for waging light, fast operations (of the sort favored by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). ”Fight and win quickly; do not kill many of the enemy, destroy much of his property, or kill many of his civilians; and, above all, lose the barest minimum of U.S. soldiers because the soft American public will not tolerate high casualties” — this sort of cautious, fastidious war-making, Anonymous contends, is ”a recipe for disaster,” invariably leaving behind ”half-finished or, more accurately, half-started wars that will be refought later.”